The Interstate Bridge Oregonians Deserve
We should instead seize this unique opportunity to rethink how we move as a region. Oregon and Washington, and Portland and Vancouver do need a new bridge–but one that reflects our values.
Oregon has a unique opportunity—one that would allow us to improve mobility in the region and better link transit systems and major destinations, all the while connecting communities of color to each other and employment centers. It seems like the perfect feel-good project for any elected official or voter in the state, and that a simple “yes” vote would be in order. But there is nothing simple about replacing the aging Interstate Bridge.
Past Attempts at Replacement
The current Interstate Bridge Replacement program (“IBR”) follows a previous failed attempt at a new bridge. Between 2006 and 2013, Oregon and Washington State underwent a lengthy effort to plan and construct a replacement I-5 Bridge between Portland and Vancouver, its across-the-river suburb. Planners branded that iteration the Columbia River Crossing (“CRC”).
Many transportation experts and advocates doubted the necessity of the CRC, including Jim Howell–the highly esteemed former TriMet planner who championed the advent of the MAX Network. Howell, in collaboration with local architect and civil engineer George Crandall, proposed a substitute to the CRC known as the Common Sense Alternative (“CSA”).
Howell and Crandall envisioned the reuse of the current bridges for local, freight, and transit traffic; a new bascule-type lift bridge for the freeway; and, a lift in the center of the existing rail bridge that would create a more direct river channel and prevent 95% of delay-causing lifts for the freeway bridge. Additionally, the proposal called for the construction of several other smaller bridges for multi-modal non-car use. They projected these smaller projects would achieve the same net increase in mobility and capacity as the CRC, but still at half of the proposed cost.
Public opposition to the CRC was also fierce and from both ends of the political spectrum. Portland progressives objected to what they saw as a suburban-sprawl-inducing and freeway-expanding mega project. Clark County conservatives opposed any toll or tax to help pay the $3.5B price tag.
The project’s inclusion of light rail also bore a major political cost. The majority of residents in Clark County at the time opposed the MAX being brought into Vancouver. Opponents gave it the nickname “The Crime Train.” Ultimately, it was the Republican-controlled coalition in the Washington State Senate that killed the project in 2014 when they refused to authorize any more funds for its implementation.
Progress on a new crossing sat dead until two years ago when the IBR was conceived, spurred on by pressure from the federal government. Collectively, the states spent $150 million of federal money in the planning of the CRC–which they were obligated to repay unless they resumed planning for another bridge. However, as local economist and bridge opponent Joe Cortright has pointed out, the states can also avoid having to repay the money should they select the no-build option.
While not moving forward with any design is a viable legal avenue, its practicality is dubious. Leaving the crossing “as is'' will only allow conditions to worsen, and will do nothing to improve regional mobility or increase regional resiliency.
Why the Status Quo Can’t Persist
The current bridge no longer serves the area well. Even its name, confusingly just the Interstate Bridge, is comically insufficient: it’s impossible to discuss the bridge with the public or file federal paperwork on it without there being some confusion as to which interstate bridge you are referring (Portland alone has two).
The bridge is not ready for the future. Of the bridge’s two spans—one built in 1917 and the other in 1958—neither structure is seismically rated. One or both could collapse even in a fairly mild earthquake. It’s no question in the minds of engineers that in the “Big One,” a predicted 9.0 earthquake that could shake the region for up to six minutes, both spans would completely crumble.
The bridge is also a source of chronic gridlock. Too many short on- and off-ramps, an absence of a dedicated transit right-of-way, and frequent lifts of the bridge’s moveable span create a nightmare not only for local traffic, but also interstate and international movement on I-5 between Canada and Mexico. The lift is the only stoplight on I-5 between the two international borders.
While the CSA by Howell brings forward ideas about the future of transportation in the Pacific Northwest that leaders have (unforgivably) not taken seriously, the fact remains that the current spans are burdens to our transportation system. They likely cannot be re-used in any capacity. Transit, cars, and freight need to move across the Columbia irrespective of river traffic: having a lift span for any of them creates unacceptable delays for all. A tunnel has also been deemed unviable.
Clearly, we need a new bridge. But it won’t be easy.
Many of the political obstacles that plagued the CRC remain. Environmental groups that oppose more car infrastructure in the midst of a climate crisis have grown in influence and number. The reputation of the MAX has deteriorated even further. The price of a new major fixed bridge has ballooned from $3.6B to $5B. Strong opposition to tolling among drivers has remained steady. Simultaneously, congestion in the region has increased. Freight interests have become more vocal about the need for an improvement. All the while, Clark County’s population has grown the most out of the four-county Portland metro area. The forces on the tug-rope have only increased.
Perfect Time for Action
However, several key elements have changed. Democrats now hold strong majorities in both chambers of both state houses, in addition to both states having Democratic governors. More importantly, President Biden has just signed into law one of the most sweeping investments in infrastructure since the New Deal: a measure that specifically prescribes $16B for bridges, $10B for high-cost multimodal projects, and an unprecedented $23B for fixed-guideway transit (meaning buses with dedicated lanes or rail). Oregon has few projects currently in development that can be imminently considered, and even fewer which could have such a transformative effect on the region.
The task for policymakers now becomes converting this heightened incentive to act into actual consensus–one that aligns with our shared values as Pacific Northwesterners: climate sustainability, racial equity, and overcoming political (and literal) gridlock to create forward thinking designs. Right now, the IBR is failing to achieve that.
The IBR Shouldn’t be CRC 2.0, It Should be Better
Comparisons between the IBR and the CRC are common, and it’s hard not to draw them. Some of the shared aspects of design, such as eliminating the need for lifts with a much taller fixed-bridge, are logical. Others are not–like the continued insistence on greatly expanding the number of lanes from six to 10, and with it massively increasing the number of vehicles traveling. It should also be noted that a new 10-lane bridge will still plug into a six-lane freeway through North Portland. This format will simply move the bottleneck closer to downtown and more populated areas.
When it comes to land use, the IBR is seeking to learn from the mistakes of the CRC. At its widest point across Hayden Island, the CRC was to be 17-lanes wide thanks to numerous ramps–decimating the Island’s real estate. The IBR commission is instead (correctly) heavily considering centralization around Marine Drive, with a local access bridge to the island.
However with regards to transit, the IBR is failing to even live up to the plans set by its predecessor. The promise of light rail from the Expo Center in Portland to the landmark terminus of Clark College in Vancouver on the CRC has been weakened on the IBR. It’s now just a commitment to some form of “high capacity transit” between Hayden and the Vancouver waterfront.
The IBR must break away from the outdated paradigm that governed the design of the CRC, and instead create a better one.
The Road to Success
To start, this project must be brought back to an engineering and climate-considerate reality.
Urban planners have known since the construction of the bridges and tunnels into Manhattan during the early and mid-20th century that more vehicle lanes eventually create more traffic. While this may seem initially counterintuitive, the dynamic is quite simple: the easier it is to drive, the more people will drive. With time, any added capacity is eaten up by the increase in drivers, further exacerbated by the inevitable proliferation of car-dependent, sprawling, unwalkable architecture. This process is known as induced demand, and it should be regarded as a cardinal truth in transportation.
This tired, old song must end. More lanes are not the answer.
This brings us to the next stage. Leaders must provide better public education about the known and unknown consequences of a new bridge. They must make decisions based on science and not misguided opinion polls. They must center this project in the community’s—in Oregon’s—values.
Bridge authorities often point to survey results that show Oregonians' distaste of tolls and congestion pricing. They also cite polling indicating the public’s desire for faster and more reliable commutes. In the same polls, the public commonly selects more lanes as their preferred policy solution to achieve these goals. The perceived public backing for more lanes has fueled the momentum for the major expansion of capacity. However, if you polled the same Oregonians and Vancouver-residents about the values and principles they want the bridge to embody– I am confident that sustainability, financial solvency, and social equity would be at the top.
This design will not realize those values. The 10-lane bridge proposal, ODOT’s continued pursuit of a Rose Quarter freeway widening that lacks local support, and funds allocated toward interchange expansions up and down the surrounding I-5 corridor all add up to more of the inadequate status quo.
The focus of our transit vision should be economic growth, increasing freight mobility, improving regional connectivity, and possibly even reducing net emissions. None of that will be meaningfully achieved by focusing on improving commute times for single occupancy vehicles.
Freight-exclusive lanes should also be considered as part of that vision. A thorough analysis of travel lanes and their effects on emissions must be conducted. And transit must be a cornerstone of the bridge, not just an afterthought or an added bonus. As many C-Tran and TriMet bus, rapid bus, and rail lines as feasible should cross the Columbia to provide the most direct connections and fewest transfers. The Clark College and Vancouver VA Hospital shared complex must be again treated as a possible terminus for light rail.
Critics have long argued that because transit trips account for a fraction of total trips across the bridge, any money allocated to public transportation amounts to a waste of money. That position lacks the broader vision that this project deserves. This is an opportunity to reshape how we move around, not just (temporarily) speed-up the ways in which we currently do it. Portland has a rich history in reshaping transportation. The freeway revolt of the 1970s that started in Portland gave way to the MAX, and light rail is now a feature across the country. It is imperative that we remember our previous local success in giving our communities a wide range of transportation options.
A transit-focused bridge is also an issue of racial equity, which should be more than merely a transportation talking point. While North Portland remains a major center for people of color, gentrification and displacement have pushed many into the far corners of Clark County. The county experienced a 79% increase in its population of POCs just in the last 10 years. People of color are also twice as likely to not have a car, and three times more likely to live next to a freeway and experience poorer air quality as a result.
The outcome of this project shouldn’t be to saddle residents of North Portland and Vancouver with a freeway mega project, but to provide them with better connectivity through sustainable means.
Conclusion
ODOT and regional leaders should remember that environmental laws, particularly in Oregon, are not on their side when it comes to infrastructure that will cause more pollution. By pursuing a bridge that seeks to expand unsustainable transportation design, local and state leaders are missing the mark and opening up the IBR to a barrage of legal challenges.
We should instead seize this unique opportunity (and historic levels of federal and state funding) to rethink how we move as a region. Oregon and Washington, and Portland and Vancouver do need a new bridge–but one that reflects our values.
Student of architecture and sustainable urban development at Portland State University. Transportation, housing, and urban policy advocate. Life-long Oregonian and Portlander.
photo credit: "Fiery Interstate bridge" by Eric Kuschner is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0